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As one possible solution to the well-known ﬁnancing crisis of unfunded social
security systems, an increase in the retirement age is a popular option. To in-
duce workers to retire later, it has been proposed to strengthen the link between
retirement age and beneﬁt level. The present paper is devoted to analyzing the
long-run ﬁnancial implications of such a reform. We show that with actuarial ad-
justments the long-run contribution rate is an increasing function of the retirement
age chosen by workers. Moreover, the implicit tax paid to the pension system by
a participant can increase in the long run if the retirement age rises in response
to a “steep” adjustment rule. In this sense, the proposed “cure” may worsen the
disease. Finally, we propose an alternative adjustment scheme which avoids these
negative consequences. Finally, we show how the negative effects can be avoided
by forming a capital stock from the additional revenues due to later retirement.
JEL-classiﬁcation: H55, J18.
Keywords: Pay-as-you-go, retirement age, actuarial adjustment.
Zusammenfassung
Als ein m¨ oglicher Ausweg aus der drohenden Finanzkrise umlageﬁnanzierter
Rentensysteme wird gegenw¨ artig eine Anhebung des Rentenzugangsalters von
vielen favorisiert. Um allerdings Arbeitnehmern einen Anreiz zur Verl¨ angerung
der Lebensarbeitszeit zu geben, muss nach Auffassung der meisten Experten die
Beziehung zwischen Beitr¨ agen und Rentenanspr¨ uchen gest¨ arkt werden. In dieser
Arbeit werden die langfristigen ﬁnanziellen Konsequenzen einer solchen Reform
analysiert. Wir zeigen, dass bei versicherungsmathematischen Zuschl¨ agen f¨ ur
Mehrarbeit der Beitragssatz langfristig eine steigende Funktion des tats¨ achlich
gew¨ ahltenRentenalters ist. Dar¨ uber hinaussteigtauch die impliziteSteuer, dieein
repr¨ asentativer Versicherter an die Rentenkasse zahlt, sofern das Rentenalter in
Folge einer ,,steilen” Zuschlagsfunktion zunimmt. In diesem Sinne k¨ onnte die
vorgeschlagene ,,Behandlung” die diagnostizierte ,,Krankheit” verschlimmern.
Abschließend zeigen wir, wie der negative Effekt durch Aufbau eines Kapital-
stocks vermieden werden kann.
JEL-Klassiﬁkation: H55, J18.
Schlagw¨ orter: Umlageverfahren, Rentenzugangsalter, versicherungsmathe-
matische Zuschl¨ age.1. Introduction
There is widespread agreement that population aging in most OECD countries
has led to a crisis of pay-as-you-go ﬁnanced of old age pensions. Indicators of the
“crisis” are rising contribution or “tax” rates, falling replacement rates and, more
sophisticated, rising levels of the implicit tax paid by a representative participant,
which is calculated as the present value of all (expected) pension beneﬁts minus
all contributions made.






a straightforward conclusion is that a worsening of the ratio of contribution rate
and replacement rate can be prevented if the worker/pensioner-ratio is increased.
Moreover, the most effective way to improve this ratio is by increasing average
retirement age because this measure both raises the numerator and depresses the
denominator of this ratio. One obvious way of achieving this seems to be raising
the legal retirement age, as it is gradually being done in the U.S. over the next
decade or so.
However, thereare twopossibleobjectionstothisreformstrategy: ﬁrst, raisingthe
retirement age while holding the level of retirement beneﬁts constant is equivalent
to cutting the beneﬁt level, and it is hard to see why the implicit beneﬁt cut should
be better than the explicit one. Secondly, as long as there are early-retirement
options, raising the legal retirement age may be less effective than inﬂuencing the
factual mean retirement age, which in most countries falls short of the legal retire-
ment age by several years. Factual retirement age, in turn, may depend to a large
degree on the adjustment rules which determine how the pension claims vary with
the retirement age chosen by the individual.
In the last few years, there has been a tremendous amount of research into the mi-
croeconometrics of the retirement decision, most prominently by a joint research
project conducted by researchers in eleven countries.2 Cross-section evidence
presented in a volume edited by Gruber and Wise (1999) shows clearly that the
factual retirement age is lower the “ﬂatter” the adjustment schedule is. Therefore
the editors conclude that “social security program provisions have indeed con-
tributed to the decline in labor force participation of older persons. ... It seems
1In this equation, both sides are already divided by the factor “average wages”.
2See, e.g., Blundell and Johnson (1998), B¨ orsch-Supanand Schnabel (1998),Gruber and Wise
(1998) and Kapteyn and de Vos (1998).
1evident that, if the trend toward early retirement is to be reversed, a move that
will almost surely be dictated by demographic trends, changing the provisions of
social security programs that induce early retirement will play a key role” (ibid.,
p.35).
Put more bluntly, the adjustment of the pension claims with respect to retiring be-
fore orafterreachingthelegalretirementagehavetobeincreasedtoinducepeople
to work longer and retire later. In particular, some authors propose “age-neutral
systems” inwhich the adjustmentsfollowactuarial rules, i.e. the marginal implicit
tax on working longer should be eliminated altogether to facilitate an “undis-
torted” choice of retirement age (see, e.g., B¨ orsch-Supan and Schnabel (1998),
B¨ orsch-Supan (2000)).
The present paper is devoted to analyzing the long-run ﬁnancial implications of
actuarial adjustments of pension claims with respect to retirement age in a pay-
as-you-go pension scheme. For a small open economy, we shall ask the following
questions:
1. Suppose that to induce people to work longer, the beneﬁt adjustment rule
has to be changed to an actuarial rule. After such a change, would the new
long-run contribution rate be higher or lower than before the reform?
2. In the same setting, would the implicit tax that a representative worker pays
intothe systemina newsteady state withactuarial adjustmentand increased
retirement age be higher or lower than before the change?
3. How would the answers to questions 1. and 2. change if it was sufﬁcient for
an increase of the retirement age to incorporate the ”pay-as-you-go”-return
rate, i.e. the growth rate of the wage bill, into the adjustment rule?
4. How will contribution rate and implicit tax rate change over time during an
adjustment process from a lower to a higher retirement age?
The ﬁrst three questions refer to a pure steady-state comparison, while the fourth
question looks at the effects of an increase in the retirement age over time, the
simplest case of which may be a sudden jump in period t from a low value E0 to a
higher value E1.
We will ﬁrst answer these questions for changes of the adjustment rule that leave
the levelofretirementbeneﬁtsatthe currentfactualretirementage constant. How-
ever, the proposals mentioned before can also be given a different interpretation,
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Figure 1: Changes in the adjustment rule
the beneﬁt level at the legal retirement age constant. As the current factual retire-
ment age is smaller than the legal retirement age, such a move can be decomposed
into two separate steps: (i) lowering the beneﬁt level at the current retirement age,
and (ii) making the beneﬁt adjustment “steeper”. The ﬁrst step by itself obvi-
ously lowers both the long-run contribution rate and the long-run implicit tax, but
it is still interesting to know whether this also holds for the two steps combined.
Therefore, we analyze this policy change as well.
In Figure 1, the two changes of the adjustment rule are illustrated. Initially, the
retirement beneﬁts schedule is given by the line AB. If the level of retirement ben-
eﬁts is kept constant at the factual retirement age and the adjustment rule is made
steeper, the schedule turns counterclockwise around point A. The new schedule
is given by the line AC. If the beneﬁt level is held constant at the legal retire-
ment age, the schedule turns counterclockwise around point B leading to the new
schedule DB. As a consequence, retirement beneﬁts fall at the factual retirement
age.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we brieﬂy review the previous
literature. In Section 3 we formulate a continuous-time model of a steady state
economy in which different rules of adjustment of pension claims to the num-
ber of working years can be compared. In Section 4, we shall analyze the con-
sequences of changing the adjustment rule when the beneﬁt level at the current
3factual retirement age is kept constant. We ﬁrst answer questions 1. through 3.
by holding the new adjustment rule ﬁxed and comparing steady states that differ
in the retirement age. Subsequently, we shall answer question 4 by giving a few
numerical examples of typical transition paths from an old to the new steady state
with higher retirement age. Section 5 is devoted to the case in which the beneﬁt
level at the legal retirement age is kept constant. Section 6 discusses an alterna-
tive system in which the redistributive effects found in the previous sections are
avoided. Policy implications of our results will be discussed in Section 7.
2. Previous Results
A ﬁrst analysis of some of the questions addressed in this paper was performed
by the present authors in Breyer et al. (1997). In a discrete-time model the special
case of a zero interest rate and an actuarial adjustment rule was examined.3 In the
present paper all these limitations will be removed.
The related question of an “optimal” rate of return to social security contributions
has been addressed before byHassler and Lindbeck (1997), (1999) withinan OLG
framework in which each individual lives for two periods and works only in the
ﬁrst. So the problem of choosing the retirement age is not addressed directly but
only indirectly through the general labor supply decision. The authors show that
the adjustment rule which maximizes steady-state utility of a representative indi-
vidual equalizes marginal and average return to social security contributions. In
other words, the optimal adjustment rule is not actuarial fairness (rate of return
equal to the interest rate) but “pay-as-you-go fairness” (rate of return equal to the
growth rate of GDP).
However, the two-period-OLG framework in these papers is not suited to analyze
the distributionalconsequences on the different cohorts of introducing a particular
adjustment rule if the several cohorts work at the same time. Furthermore, the
analysis is conﬁned to the case of a ﬁxed contribution rate whereas holding the
utility of the “old” generation constant at the introduction of a new adjustment
rule requires ﬁxing the beneﬁt level.




In a continuous-time model, we examine a small open economy in which the
interest rate r, the rate of population growth m and the rate of wage growth g are
all constant. All individuals are assumed to have a life expectancy of exactly T.





￿ denotes the number of individuals entering the labor force at time t
￿ x.



















































































































The dependency ratio q is deﬁned as the number of pensioners per worker. Hence,






































and is independent of t in a steady state.4
4Throughout the analysis, we concentrate on the more general case m
￿
￿ 0. The extension to
m
￿ 0 is straightforward.










3.2. The pension system




￿ , and contribution rates, b
￿
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The contribution rate is the same for every worker. In contrast, the pension level
is determined for each pensioner i individually and takes account of his earnings
history. In particular, the individual replacement rate, can be expressed as a func-
tion of the length of the working life and thus of the retirement age of individual













is assumed to have the following properties:











a1) a minimum retirement age, before which retirement beneﬁts can not
be collected, or
a2) a “legal” retirement age, from which the individual can in principle
deviate in both directions.
b) If individual i retires at age Es, then his/her replacement rate is equal to ns,












































z is the rate of return on extra working years within the pension system:
6– if individual i retires at age Es
￿ E
￿
, then the left-hand side of (5) is
the present value of extra contributions and foregone beneﬁts in the
extra working years between age E
￿
and Es based on the discount rate
z. Likewise, the right-hand side of (5) is equal to the corresponding
present value of the increase in pensions from n
￿
to ns. Notice that the
compensation through higher pension beneﬁts is actuarially fair if z is
equal to interest rate r.
– if the individual i retires at age Es
￿ E
￿
, which is possible in case
a2) but not in a1), then the left-hand side of (5) corresponds to the
present value of avoided contributions and additional beneﬁts in the
time period between Es and E
￿
based on the discount rate z. The right-
hand side of (5) is equal to the corresponding present value of the cut
in pensions from n
￿
to ns. Again, the adjustment is actuarially fair if
z
￿ r.
A steady state s
￿ 0
￿ 1 is characterized by a uniform value of the retirement age,
Ei
s
￿ Es chosen by all individuals i at all times. In a steady state, the replacement
rate ns, the contribution rate bs, and the dependency ratio qs are all constant over










In a steady state, we obtain for the relationship between the replacement and the
contribution rate and the rate of return on extra working time, z:
Proposition 1: Suppose the rate of return on extra working time is increased.
















Clearly, the steady state effects of an increase in rate on return on extra working
time depend on whether the factual retirement age is below or above the legal
retirement age. In the ﬁrst case, individuals are “punished” for working less than
E
￿
. Hence, the replacement rate and the contribution rate are lower in the steady
state. In the latter case, individuals receive additional compensation for time they
contribute in excess of E
￿
which leads to a higher replacement and contribution
rate in the steady state.
73.3. The effects of an increase in the retirement age
3.3.1. Contribution rates
Examining the relationship between retirement age and contribution rate in a
steady state, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 2: Suppose steady state 1 is characterized by a retirement age
E1











The intuition for the result in Proposition 2 is the following: In a pay-as-you-go
pension system, all retirement beneﬁts of a given cohort, including the compen-
sation for having worked longer, have to be ﬁnanced by later cohorts of workers.
Now suppose everybody works exactly one period longer. Then there are two
effects on the contribution rate that have to be paid by subsequent cohorts:
(i) total contributions rise and total retirement beneﬁts fall by the amounts paid
or not received, respectively, by those who retire later. This effect alone
would depress the contribution rate,
(ii) all pensioners now receive higher pensions as a compensation. This effect
alone would raise the contribution rate.
In assessing the relative sizes of the two effects, two facts must be taken into
account: Since the compensation accrues later than additional contributions, it
can be ﬁnanced from an increased wage bill. On the other hand, the compensation
itself is bigger than the extra payment by the return paid on it. Now it becomes
clear that if the rate or return equals the growth rate of the wage bill (m
￿ g),
the two effects exactly offset each other, and the contribution rate stays the same.
However, if the rate of return fall short of m
￿ g, the ﬁrst effect is dominant and
the contribution must fall. Finally, if the rate of return exceeds m
￿ g, the second
effect is larger in size than the ﬁrst one, and the contribution rate must go up. In
particular, this is the case if the adjustment is actuarially fair, i.e. if z
￿ r. In
this case the contribution rate must rise in the long run because the pay-as-you-go
system can only generate a smaller rate of return.
83.3.2. Implicit taxes
We measure the intergenerational distribution effects due to the unfunded pension
system by the implicit taxes T
￿
t
￿ of the individuals born at time t. These corre-
spond to the difference between the present value of contributions and the present
value ofpensionpayments. Under pay-as-you-go-pensionsystemswitha constant
replacement rate, bs and ns are constant in steady state s. Given a steady state in-



































Using (2) and (6) and assuming r
￿




















































































In a steady state, implicit taxes Ts
￿
t
￿ are positive if and only if r
￿ m
￿ g (see
Kifmann and Schindler (2000)). In the following, we assume that this condition
is fulﬁlled.
Comparing steady states with different levels of the retirement age, we obtain the
following result:
Proposition 3: If E1
￿ E0 and z
￿ m









The intuition for this result is straightforward if Proposition 2 is taken into ac-
count. Suppose that the pension beneﬁt adjustment formula provides a rate of
5The extension to r
￿ g is straightforward.
9return to the additional contributions which is equal to the growth rate of the wage
bill, m
￿ g. From Proposition 2 we know that in this case the steady-state con-
tribution rate (per period of time) is independent of the retirement age. But this
means that by working longer, everybody pays a higher total contribution to a
system with an internal rate of return which is lower than the interest rate. This
means that in present value terms the loss incurred by participating in the system
is increased precisely because the size of the investment is increased.
Once it is established that the implicit taxes rise with an increase in the retirement
age even if the contribution rate remains the same, it is easy to see that taxes must
rise even more if the contribution rate increases, which (by Proposition 2) is the
case for z
￿ m
￿ g. In this case the size of the investment in a low-yield system
rises for two reasons: both the investment per period (contribution rate) and the
length of the contribution period (working life) rise.
Finally, notice that z
￿ m
￿ g is only a sufﬁcient condition for implicit taxes to rise
in a steady state upon an increase in the retirement age. Even if z
￿ m
￿ g, it is
possible that implicit taxes increase. In this case, the effect of a longer period of
time in which individuals contribute to the pension system overcompensates the
fall in the contribution rate.
104. Changingtheadjustmentrulewithaconstantben-
eﬁt level at the initial retirement age
In this section, we examine the consequences of creating incentives to retire later
by increasing the rate of return z on extra working years in the pension formula
(5). The initial beneﬁt level is kept constant which is equivalent to the assump-
tion that the initial retirement age E0 is equal to the legal retirement age E
￿
. We
assume in line with the empirical evidence that an increase in z will lead to an
increase in the retirement age. In the new steady state, we therefore have E1
￿ E0.
If the initial retirement age E0 corresponds to the standard retirement age E
￿
, then
we know from Proposition 1 that the replacement rate n0 and the contribution rate




state consequences of an increase in the retirement age on the contribution rate
and on implicit taxes therefore follow straightforwardly from Propositions 2 and
3:
￿
by Proposition 2, the contribution rate rises if and only if the new value of
z is larger than m
￿ g. In particular, the contribution rate increases if the
adjustment rule is changed to an actuarial rule. If the rate on return on extra
working time is set equal to the growth rate of the wage bill, m
￿ g, then the
long-run contribution rate is not affected.
￿
by Proposition 3, z
￿ m
￿ g is a sufﬁcient condition for implicit taxes to be
higher in the new steady. Thus, setting the rate on return on extra working
time equal to the growth rate of the wage bill already puts a larger burden
on future generations. Switching to an actuarial rule yields even higher
long-run implicit taxes.
Once the results for different steady states are derived, it is easy to make quali-
tative statements on how the contribution rate and the implicit taxes behave in a
transition from a steady state with a lower to one with a higher retirement age.
Suppose that all cohorts who enter the labor force before some period t
￿
retire
after E0 years of working, whereas all later-born generations retire after E1 years
with E1
￿ E0. The short-term effect on the contribution rate after period t
￿
￿ E0
is clearly dampening because ceteris paribus more persons work and contribute
and fewer are pensioners, whereas the level of retirement beneﬁts per pensioners,
which is determined by their former labor supply behavior, remains unaffected.
On the other hand we know from Proposition 2 that - at least in the case of
z
￿ m
￿ g, - the long-run contribution rate must be larger than or equal to the
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12initial level, b0. This proves that the behavior of the contribution rate over time
must follow a V-shaped curve. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate this pattern for a speciﬁc











￿ 1%. All individuals born before pe-
riod -40 retire at age E0
￿ 40 while everyone born in period -40 or afterwards
retires at age E1
￿ 41. Therefore, the dependency ratio falls in period 0. The
replacement rate is n0
￿ 70% which leads to an contribution rate of b0
￿ 30
￿08%.
With respect to implicit taxes, it is well known (for a proof see, e.g., Sinn (2000))
that in a dynamically efﬁcient economy, total discounted net payments of all
presently living and future cohorts into an unfunded pension system are exoge-
nously given and determined by the accumulated net gains of all past cohorts.
This establishes that in the transition to a new steady state with higher retirement
age, there must be cohorts whose implicit taxes fall relative to the case in which
the old steady state is maintained. This is precisely because by Proposition 3, the
net payments of later generations increase if z is at least equal to m
￿ g.
Again, this general pattern is illustrated for our numerical example by Figures
4 and 5, in which the abscissa refers to the cohort entering the labor force at a
certain date. As predicted, implicit taxes are higher in the new steady state. The
increase is larger in Figure 4 in which the adjustment is actuarial. In this case, the
ﬁrst generation who works longer is unaffected because it is exactly compensated
for its additional contributions and foregone beneﬁts. The subsequent generations
who work longer are better off at the expense of later-born generations because
they proﬁt from the fall in the contribution rate (see Figure 2). The later-born
generations who face the new increased contribution rate, however, are worse off.
In Figure 5 in which z
￿ m
￿ g the pattern is similar. The main difference to Figure
4 is that the ﬁrst generations who work longer face an increase in implicit taxes
because their compensation falls short of an actuarial adjustment. The subsequent
generations are better off, however, because they beneﬁt from a lower contribution
rate. Again, the later-born generations who face the same contribution rate as in
the old steady state (see Figure 3) are worse off since they contribute for a longer
time to the pay-as-you-go pension system.
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Figure 6a Figure 6b
Figure 6: Steady state contribution rates
5. Cutting the beneﬁt level at the initial retirement
age
If the initial retirement age E0 falls short of the standard retirement age E
￿
, then
the replacement rate n0 and the contribution rate b0 at retirement age E0 both fall
if z is increased. Thus, there are two opposing effects with respect to the contri-
bution rate and implicit taxes. On the one hand, the cut in the beneﬁt level for
a given retirement age tends to decrease both the contribution rate and implicit
taxes in the new steady state (see Proposition 1). On the other hand, the increase
in the retirement age works in the opposite direction if z
￿ m
￿ g. Which effect is
dominant depends on the extent to which the retirement increases.
Figure 6a and 6b illustrate the opposing effects on the contribution rate. They
show the steady state contributions rates bs as a function of the steady state re-
tirement age Es. The rate of return on extra working time is increased from z0 to
z1









￿ (see Proposition 1).
Since the new return of return z1 is actuarial, the steady state contribution rate b1
rises with the steady state retirement age Es by Proposition 2. The two ﬁgures
differ with respect to the initial rate of return on extra working time, z0:
￿
in Figure 6a, the initial rate of return on extra working time is smaller than
m
￿ g. By Proposition 2, the steady state contribution rate b0 thus decreases
with Es. Consequently, the new steady state contribution rate is lower than
b0 if E1
￿ ˜ E and higher than b0 if E1
￿ ˜ E. Since z0
￿ m






in Figure 6b, z0 is larger than m
￿ g. By Proposition 2, the steady state
contribution rate b0 thus increases with Es. Again, the new steady state
contribution rate is lower than b0 if E1








15z0 -1.5 % - 1 % - 0.5 % 0 % 0.5 %
˜ E 52.1 49.8 47.4 45.0 42.5
ˆ E 42.7 42.2 41.6 41.1 40.6
Table 1: Critical values of E as a function of z0




￿ is analogous. From Proposition 3,











￿ isproportionaltobs (see equation



















￿ r, there therefore exists a retirement age ˆ E such that the new











































Table 1 shows the values of ˜ E and ˆ E depending on the initial rate of return z0. The

















￿ 1%. Both critical values of E are decreasing
in z0 because the cut in beneﬁts at the initial retirement age is less pronounced the












￿ g. The critical
value for implicit taxes, ˆ E, is always smaller than E
￿
and ˜ E. Thus, the example
shows that even though there is a cut in beneﬁts as consequence of an increase
in z, a relatively small increase in the retirement age may be sufﬁciently large to
lead to higher implicit taxes in the new steady state. Furthermore, if ˆ E
￿ E1
￿ ˜ E,
implicit taxes may be higher in the new steady state although the contribution rate
has fallen.
166. A non-redistributing adjustment scheme
Up to know, we have assumed that the adjustments of beneﬁts to changes in life-
time contributions have to be made within a pure pay-as-you-go pension system,
i.e. a system whose budget must be balanced in each period. In this section, we
analyse an alternative scheme which relies on partial funding. Under this scheme,
the level of retirement beneﬁts is actuarially adjusted. Partial funding is used to
avoid intergenerational redistribution if the retirement age changes. The scheme
operates as follows:
￿
the contribution rate is ﬁxed to its initial level b0.
￿
individuals can retire whenever they want.
￿
the replacement rate of each individual is calculated such that implicit taxes




￿ as the desired level of implicit taxes for individuals entering the labor
force at t, life expectancy T and retirement age E
￿
t
















































the capital market is used as a buffer if the budget of the pay-as-you-go
pension scheme is not balanced.
For example, this scheme allows to switch to an actuarial adjustment of pension
claims while ﬁxing implicit taxes at their intial level T0
￿
t
￿ . For the parameters
above, Figure 7 shows the resulting capital stock per capita as a percentage of
yearly income if the retirement age increases to 41 or 42 periods for generations
entering the labor force in period -40 and later. As a consequence, the pension
system runs a surplus from period 0 to period 13 because the dependency ratio
falls and earlier-born generations still obtain a pension according to the initial
replacement rate n0
￿ 70%. The surplus is higher, the larger the increase in the
retirement age. The surplus turns into a deﬁcit after period 14 because then all













￿0% according to formula (9). The fund, on the
other hand, generates interest income out of the accumulated savings. In total, the
capital stock per capita grows at the same rate as wages after period 14 because


























































pensions grow at this rate as well. Clearly, it might be tempting to use this steady
state capital stock for other purposes. Therefore, strict rules have to be formulated
and obeyed as to the use of the accumulated funds for “additional” beneﬁts.
7. Policy conclusions
In summarizing the main results of our paper, we can say that within a pure pay-
as-you-go system the short-run and the long-run ﬁnancial implications of induc-
ing people to work longer can be quite different: If the inducement necessary to
achieve a higher average retirement age involves making the pension adjustment
formula actuarial (or at least paying a higher return to the extra contributions than
to the average lifetime contribution) while leaving the beneﬁt level at the initial
retirement age unchanged, then the short-run drop in the contribution rate will be
followed by a long-run increase in this rate. Even worse, if one thinks that the true
measure of welfare loss from contributing to an unfunded pension system is the
implicit tax, the same time pattern with respect to this indicator (gains for early
cohorts, losses for later cohorts) prevails under even less restrictive conditions. A
sufﬁcient condition for a rising long-run implicit tax is that the adjustment for-
mula uses the growth rate of the wage bill as the internal rate of return.
18If the factual retirement age falls short of the legal retirement age, then making
the pension adjustment formula actuarial has an additional effect. At the initial
retirement age, the beneﬁt level is cut which tends to lower the long-run contribu-
tion rate and the level of implicit taxes. However, this effect can be dominated by
the consequences of an increased retirement age. In particular, relatively small in-
creases in the retirement age may be sufﬁcient to lead to a higher level of implicit
taxes.
The main conclusion which follows from these results is that a policy supposed
to bring about efﬁciency gains may lead to considerable intergenerational redis-
tribution. In fact, making the adjustment formula more responsive to retirement
age may shift even more of the implicit tax burden in the pay-as-you-go pension
system to later-born generations. In this sense, the “pension crisis” is not solved
by increasing the retirement age.
We have also shown that later generations can be insulated from any negative
effects of changes in the retirement age of earlier generations if the adjustments
are self-ﬁnancing, using a capital stock in which the additional beneﬁts and saved
beneﬁts are accumulated. However, such a scheme can only operate if strict rules
are formulated and enforced with respect to the use of the accumulated funds.
Furthermore, it has to be emphasized that the mixed system resulting from such a
reform has nothing to do with the ”partial funding” proposals that are nowadays
all too popular (see, e.g. Feldstein and Liebman ( 2001)) and whose merits are
discussed elsewhere (Breyer (2001)). As opposed to these proposals, we do not
claim to bring about “efﬁciency gains” by using partial funding. The objective of
our scheme is to avoid undesirable intergenerational redistribution.
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Proof of Proposition 1
We prove Proposition 1 for
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the convexity of the exponential function implies
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Below it is shown that if T
￿ E and a



























22is decreasing in E if a
￿ 0 and increasing in E if a
￿ 0. If a
￿ m, then f does not
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on E, then it is straightforward to show that b1
￿ b0.
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Therefore, the function f is decreasing in E if a
￿ 0 and increasing in E if a
￿ 0
if T
￿ E and a
￿ m and increasing in E if a
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24Proof of Proposition 3
For the implicit taxes of generation t, T1
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t








































¿From Proposition 2, we have b1
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